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The importance of R&D investment in explaining economic growth is well documented in 
the literature. Policies by modern governments increasingly recognise the benefits of 
supporting R&D investment. Government funding has however become an increasingly 
scarce resource in times of financial crisis and economic austerity. Hence it is important that 
available funds are used and targeted effectively. This paper offers the first systematic review 
and critical discussion of what the R&D literature has to say currently about the effectiveness 
of major public R&D policies in increasing private R&D investment. Public policies are 
considered within three categories, R&D tax credits and direct subsidies, support of the 
university research system and the formation of high-skilled human capital, and support of 
formal R&D cooperations across a variety of institutions. Crucially, the large body of more 
recent literature observes a shift away from the earlier findings that public subsidies often 
crowd-out private R&D to finding that subsidies typically stimulate private R&D. Tax credits 
are also much more unanimously than previously found to have positive effects. University 
research, high-skilled human capital, and R&D cooperation also typically increase private 
R&D. Recent work indicates that accounting for non-linearities is one area of research that 
may refine existing results. 
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    In the light of the importance of R&D investment in explaining economic growth, it comes 
as no surprise that analysis of the driving factors of R&D remains a subject of key 
methodological and empirical concern to economic researchers. The positive impact of R&D 
on growth and productivity has been predicted by a considerable number of theoretical 
contributions, and a broad corpus of empirical work has supported this result at the firm, 
industry and country level (see, inter alia, Arrow, 1962a; Romer, 1986, 1990; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Proudman and Redding, 1998; for the theory and, 
inter alia, Cameron, Proudman and Redding, 2005; Kafouros, 2005; Coe, Helpman and 
Hoffmaister, 2009; O'Mahony and Vecchi, 2009; Bravo-Ortega and Marin, 2011; for recent 
empirical evidence). 
    Policies by modern governments increasingly recognise the benefits of supporting R&D 
investment. In part this is testimony to the importance of Nelson's (1959) and Arrow's 
(1962b) early insights into the motives underlying R&D investments. In essence, the 
argument proceeds from the observation that industrial R&D exhibits a classic public goods 
problem in that it is both non-rivalrous and not (completely) excludable. If the private rate of 
return thus is below the social rate of return, as firms are unable to fully appropriate the 
returns from their R&D, private R&D investment has positive externalities and could be 
lower than socially optimal. The empirical evidence provided in Griliches (1979, 1998) 
confirms that the private rate of return to industry R&D typically is below the social rate of 
return. This mismatch of returns provides economic justification for government support of 
private R&D. 
    Government funding has however become an increasingly scarce resource in times of 
financial crisis and economic austerity. Hence it is important that available funds are used 
and targeted effectively. The objective of this paper therefore is to offer the first systematic 
review and critical discussion of what the R&D literature has to say currently about the 
effectiveness of major public R&D policies in increasing private R&D investment. This 
review considers direct and indirect effects of policies, different channels through which 
policies take effect, and types of firms or industries that stand to benefit most from different 
policies. Based on the review, remaining challenges for future research are identified. 
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    Public policies are considered within three categories, R&D tax credits and direct 
subsidies, support of the university research system and the formation of high-skilled human 
capital, and support of formal R&D cooperations across a variety of institutions. There is to 
date no survey that draws together the existing evidence on the effects of these major types of 
direct and indirect government support of private R&D. Moreover there are no individual 
surveys of the fast growing empirical literatures on the second and third R&D policy 
categories. Surveys of the likewise rapidly advancing literature on the first category, R&D 
tax credits (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000) and direct subsidies (David, Hall and Toole, 2000; 
García-Quevedo, 2004), exist essentially only for the early, mainly pre-2000 work. Crucially, 
the large body of more recent literature observes a shift away from the earlier findings that 
public subsidies often crowd-out private R&D to finding that subsidies typically stimulate 
private R&D. The recent evidence on the effectiveness of tax credits also importantly 
suggests much more unanimously than concluded in the earlier work that there are positive 
R&D effects. This review focuses on the recent empirical evidence.1 
    With regard to university research, specific and general measures of high-skilled human 
capital, and R&D cooperation, the more recent empirical evidence also finds a number of 
positive effects on private R&D investment. 
    The paper is structured as follows. As the focus is on the empirical literature, section 2 
provides a brief overview of the methodological issues involved in estimating models of 
R&D investment. Section 3 first presents the key predictions from theory regarding the R&D 
effect of each type of public policy. It then reviews the existing empirical literature and links 
the results to the theory. Section 4 discusses some remaining questions and challenges for 





                                                          
1 As the focus is on the empirical literature, the paper concentrates on the seminal thus typically early 
contributions regarding the theoretical literature. 
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2. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
2.1 Data and measurement of R&D 
    The first issue is how to measure and compare R&D across firms, industries and countries. 
Input measures, such as R&D expenditure or R&D intensity, as well as output measures, such 
as patents or innovation counts, have been used. One advantage of input measures is that their 
economic (monetary) value may be taken as homogenous, while the economic value of 
output measures such as patent counts is heterogeneous. Furthermore, the propensity to patent 
varies considerably across industries and countries, and even a high patent count need not 
imply a high level of innovation as some patents may never be implemented. However, 
because of its input character, higher R&D spending need not necessarily imply higher 
innovative output either. In practice, input and output measures appear to be correlated (e.g. 
Acs and Audretsch, 1988; Bound, Cummins, Griliches, Hall and Jaffe, 1984). 
    Most of the empirical work on the determinants of R&D focuses on R&D expenditures or 
R&D intensity. The comparability of the results from studies using different datasets may 
nonetheless be impeded by the difficulty in measuring the level of R&D expenditure 
accurately. Firms are given considerable latitude in what they choose to classify as R&D, and 
the definitions used may differ between datasets. Cohen and Mowery (1984), for instance, 
find that for the same US firms and years, Standard and Poor's Compustat data reported an 
average of 12% more R&D than the Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business Program 
data, with the difference resulting from the definitions used. The Frascati Manual publishes 
internationally agreed standards defined by the OECD (OECD, 2002). However, it is not 
always obvious from the literature whether the data definitions used follow the Frascati 
Manual. Hall (2006) provides a concise overview of the meaning of the term `R&D', its 
economic analysis and its attribute as an investment. 
 
2.2 The R&D equation 
    Most studies use as a starting point a simple panel data model of R&D investment of the 
form 
rit = a + β' Xit + εit                               (1) 
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where i indexes the cross-section units, usually firms, industries or countries, t indexes the 
units of time, usually years, r denotes R&D expenditure, X denotes the vector of explanatory 
variables, α is a constant, and εit is the error term. Other than as a convenient empirical 
starting point for an analysis of the determinants of R&D, (1) may be considered to be the 
stochastic form of the demand equation for R&D capital as derived from a CES production 
function where R&D and the flow of R&D investment are proportional to each other in 
steady state. 
    Unobserved heterogeneity between the cross-section units, as long as this is broadly stable 
over time and additive, can be controlled for by including fixed effects in the regression. 
Examples of these effects are managerial ability, language or culture. Model (1) can thus be 
re-written as the conventional within-groups or least-squares dummy variables estimator: 
rit = γ' Xit + fit + εit                               (2) 
where f denotes the fixed effects. Some studies capture common technology shocks and other 
time-variant common effects by including time dummies in (2). 
    There are in principle two ways to measure the impact of an R&D tax credit in an R&D 
equation such as (2). The first is a dummy variable equal to one if a credit is available and 
zero otherwise. While this is simple to use, disadvantages include its relative imprecision, as 
different firms may face different credit levels, and, if it varies over time, that it is not 
separately identifiable from time dummies. The second measure, much used in recent studies, 
is a price variable such as the user cost of R&D, that captures the marginal cost of R&D, 
whereby the estimated R&D response is converted to a price elasticity. This measure is 
somewhat more accurate as it estimates the response directly.2 R&D subsidies are similarly 
measured as a dummy variable or by their financial amount. More recently, subsidy effects 
have increasingly been inferred from treatment effects analyses comparing `treated', i.e. 
subsidy-receiving, and `untreated' firms. One advantage of such a non-parametric 
methodology is the availability of a counterfactual. 
    Measures of geographically localised spillovers from university research to private R&D 
include research spending by department and the number of science-specific departments of 
different quality within a given region and industry. Measures of specific or general high-
                                                          
2 For a detailed assessment, see Hall and Van Reenen (2000). 
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skilled human capital include the number of scientists and engineers in a firm, the share of 
the total number of workers with higher or tertiary education, and years of formal schooling. 
Dummy variables are typically used to measure whether or not a firm is a member of a joint 
venture or a formal R&D cooperative agreement. 
    There are a number of characteristics of R&D that suggest this type of investment should 
not be analysed in a static framework as in (2) but in a dynamic framework. One such 
characteristic is that R&D typically behaves as though it has high adjustment costs. Theory 
suggests these are important because of the high cost of temporary hiring and firing of highly 
skilled employees with firm-specific knowledge. Firms therefore tend to smooth their R&D 
investment over time (Hall, Griliches and Hausman, 1986; Lach and Schankerman, 1988). 
Hall (1993) reports that at least 50% of R&D budgets typically consist of the wages and 
salaries of highly qualified scientists and engineers, and the more recent figure of 60% 
reported in Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen (2005) suggests that this share has risen 
somewhat over time. 
    Another characteristic of R&D that calls for a dynamic approach is that there is typically a 
high degree of uncertainty associated with the output of R&D investment, and sustained 
commitment to R&D is often required for projects to be successful. The role of uncertainty is 
implicit in the early adjustment costs literature in the context of capital investment (Eisner 
and Strotz, 1963; Lucas, 1967), which captures the role of backward-looking expectations 
formation through lagged variables. More recently, part of the growing literature on 
irreversible investment has criticised this essentially ad-hoc approach to the specification of 
adjustment cost functions. Tobin (1969) made explicit the role of future expectations in q-
models of investment. 
    Most R&D studies use standard investment equation methodology to incorporate 
adjustment cost dynamics into the static R&D model (2), where the two main approaches are 
a neoclassical accelerator model with ad-hoc dynamics and an Euler equation as derived from 
forward-looking dynamic profit maximisation by firms.3 As Euler equation respresentations 
of R&D investment tend to be little robust or informative (e.g., Hall, 1991; Bond, Harhoff 
and Van Reenen, 2005), most studies use the former approach to model dynamics by 
introducing a lagged dependent variable into (2): 
                                                          




rit = ρri,t-1 + δ' Xit + fit + εit                           (3) 
 
2.3 Endogeneity 
    Inclusion of lagged R&D in (3) requires an instrumental variables estimator in order to 
avoid the downward bias that can result when using a fixed effects estimator in panels where 
the number of time periods is small (Nickell, 1981). If the firm or industry responds to 
expectations of future technological shocks, this may also result in endogeneity bias. In 
general, strict exogeneity would imply that shocks to current R&D, εit, do not affect the future 
values of the explanatory variables, and this assumption clearly does not hold for a dynamic 
model that includes a lagged dependent variable. 
    Instrumental variables can further control for endogeneity or simultaneity bias that may 
plausibly arise from most types of R&D policy measures in X: Government subsidies 
provided to the private sector may be endogenous, as the success of an application for 
funding depends on the characteristics of the firm and the application. Tax competition also 
implies that government policy and R&D tax credits may be endogenous. The user cost of 
R&D, for example, is a function of both the tax system and a range of other economic 
variables, such as the economy's real interest rate. When using a measure of highly qualified 
human capital as an explanatory variable in an R&D equation, estimations also need to take 
account of potential double counting. Indeed, R&D personnel and R&D spending have 
sometimes been used as alternative dependent variables of R&D regressions. 
    One instrumental variables technique that has been applied relatively widely in the R&D 
panel data literature is the first-differences generalised methods of moments (GMM) 
estimator (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991). The first-differencing 
transformation eliminates the individual fixed effects from the model and in contrast to the 
fixed effects estimator does not rely on asymptotic consistency in the time dimension. 
However, this estimator may be subject to large finite sample bias in cases where the 
instruments available have weak predictive power. This applies in particular when a times 
series is highly persistent, as is R&D, because lags will be poor predictors of future 
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outcomes.4 Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2002) experiment with both techniques and find 
that the point estimates are similar, but that the GMM estimates are much more imprecise. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that efficient GMM estimation in the case of very persistent 
series may be achieved by using the systems approach developed by the authors. This 
approach is increasingly used in the more recent literature. 
 
2.4 Parameter heterogeneity 
    Although estimations of R&D equations have been conducted at different levels of 
aggregation, the majority of the existing work uses firm level (panel) datasets. The models 
typically assume, and constrain, the R&D effects of the factors under consideration to be 
homogeneous across the cross-section dimension of firms, industries or countries. Under this 
assumption, the estimated coefficients reflect average effects within the sample. While 
average effects reveal important information, they do not provide any information about 
potential cross-sectional differences of the R&D effects. Set against this possible lack of 
information is the disadvantage of a smaller sample size when estimating sub-samples of 
firms or industries. Sub-sample estimates may thus be less precise, and interpretation may 
need to be more cautious. However, relatively low degrees of freedom need not necessarily 
imply a lack of precision, and authors who have split their samples into such sub-samples 
have found important differences in the R&D effects of government policy. Lach (2002), for 
instance, finds that the effect of subsidies differs between small and large firms. González 
and Pazó (2008) and Hall, Lotti and Mairesse (2009) report different R&D effects for high-
tech versus low-tech firms, and Becker and Hall (2013) confirm the existence of such 
differences at the industry level. Considering full-sample as well as sub-sample estimates 
may thus bear useful conclusions for R&D policies. 
 
2.5 Model uncertainty 
    Differences between studies may also result from the set of control variables included in 
the regressions. For instance, the precise estimated long-run elasticity of R&D with respect to 
                                                          
4 See, e.g., Hall, Griliches and Pakes (1986); Lach and Schankerman (1989); Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995); 
Blundell and Bond (1998); Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000). 
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its user cost, while being broadly around -1.0, varies depending on the model specification. 
Many alternative empirical equations have equal theoretical status, however, so that 




    Little attention has so far been paid to potential non-linearities in the relationship between 
private R&D investment and policy measures. If non-linearities are present, then traditional 
linear models may be misspecified. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003) find 
that the elasticity of private R&D with respect to a government subsidy has an inverted U-
shape for a multi-country OECD sample, which enables them to identify threshold levels of 
subsidies at which the effect of the subsidy on private R&D changes sign. Görg and Strobl 
(2007) provide similar evidenempirical evidence is provided in Woodward, Figueiredo and 
Guiamares (2006). 
 
3. PUBLIC POLICIES IN SUPPORT OF PRIVATE R&D INVESTMENT 
3.1 R&D tax credits and direct subsidies 
    The classical public finance solution to the problem that private R&D expenditure has 
positive externalities and may therefore be lower than socially optimal would be to subsidise 
the economic activity which creates the positive externality, i.e. private R&D investment. 
Two policy tools available to governments are R&D tax credits and direct subsidies of private 
R&D projects. The former is a more market-oriented approach, leaving decisions on the level 
and timing of the investment to the private sector.5 
                                                          
5 Of course, even when effective, any judgement as to the desirability of a tax credit would need to be based on 
a cost-benefit analysis that included deadweight costs and the relabelling of activities as R&D within corporate 
accounts (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). For a detailed microeconomic evaluation of the effects of a tax credit, 
see Klette, Møen and Griliches (2000). See also Jaffe (2002). For an assessment of the efficiency of public R&D 
support at the macroeconomic level, see Cincera, Czarnitzki and Thorwarth (2011). 
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    Generally, when assessing the response of private R&D spending to a change in its price, it 
is important to bear in mind the implications of what is known as the `relabelling' problem 
(Hall and Van Reenen, 2000): The true impact of a change in the tax credit on companies' 
R&D expenditure may be overestimated when using reported R&D data, as in response to an 
introduction of or an increase in the tax credit, firms have an incentive to maximise the share 
of R&D qualifying for the credit. They may thus move expenses within their accounts so as 
to ensure correct classification, whereas before the preferential tax treatment indifference 
with respect to the labelling of R&D expenses may have led to incorrect classification of at 
least part of the R&D spending. Hall and Van Reenen (2000) review some evidence in favour 
of this hypothesis. 
    Overall Hall and Van Reenen (2000) conclude in their survey of the pre-2000 literature 
that tax credits have a significant positive effect on R&D expenditure, although there is 
considerable variation in the findings of different studies. The more recent literature more 
unanimously finds a positive effect, whereby the precise estimated elasticities vary depending 
on the data, estimation method and model specification. 
    In a panel data study on the manufacturing sector of nine OECD countries for 1979-1997, 
Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2002), for instance, estimate a long-run elasticity of R&D 
with respect to its user cost of around -1.0. Applying a similar estimation approach, Li and 
Trainor (2009) obtain a long-run elasticity of around -1.4 for a panel of manufacturing plants 
in Northern Ireland for 1998-2003, and an elasticity of between -1.5 and -1.8 is reported in 
Parisi and Sembenelli (2003) for a panel of Italian firms for 1992-1997. Lokshin and Mohnen 
(2012) and Koga (2003), respectively, find somewhat lower elasticities of -0.8 for firms in 
the Netherlands during 1996-2004, and -0.7 for firms in Japan during 1989-1998. Mulkay and 
Mairesse (2013) report a long-run user cost elasticity of -0.4 for a recent 2000-2007 sample 
of French firms. For the US and the Canadian manufacturing sectors, respectively, Bernstein 
and Mamuneas (2005) estimate R&D own price elasticities of -0.8 and -0.14. The authors 
suggest that one reason why the latter elasticity is so low is that much of Canadian R&D is 
performed by foreign firms which are not as susceptible to changes in Canadian economic 
conditions as are domestic firms. Baghana and Mohnen (2009) confirm the long-run elasticity 
of -0.14 for firms in the Canadian province Québec. Using a non-parametric matching 
approach, Czarnitzki, Hanel and Rosa (2011) conclude that R&D tax credits also have a 
positive impact on Canadian firms' decision whether to conduct any R&D at all. In a rare 
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study on a newly industrialised economy, Yang, Huang and Hou (2012) confirm the evidence 
of a positive R&D effect of tax credits for Taiwan. One policy conclusion that can be drawn 
from all of these studies is that fiscal policy measures that reduce the user cost may be 
expected to increase private R&D expenditure. Overall, the average negative elasticity across 
the various studies appears to be around unity. 
    Regarding the effect of direct R&D subsidies, the surveys of earlier studies conclude that 
the econometric evidence is ambivalent and that there are additionality effects of public R&D 
on private R&D as well as crowding-out effects (David, Hall and Toole, 2000; García-
Quevedo, 2004). David, Hall and Toole (2000), for example, find that a third of the 33 
studies under review report substitution effects. However, the more recent research much 
more unanimously rejects crowding-out and tends to find additionality effects. One criticism 
of much of the earlier work has been that it neglects the problem of sample selection bias, in 
that R&D intensive firms may be more likely to apply for a subsidy (David, Hall and Toole, 
2000). Since it is likely that these firms would have undertaken at least part of the R&D even 
in the absence of the subsidy, the results may have been biased towards finding crowding-out 
effects. The availability of new econometric techniques that control for the selection bias is 
thus likely one reason for the shift away from finding crowding-out effects. 
    In this vein, applying a matching framework to samples of French and Italian firms, 
respectively, Duguet (2004) and Carboni (2011) reject crowding-out and find that public 
subsidies on average increase private R&D. Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) confirm these 
results for the German business sector. Aerts and Schmidt (2008) provide similar results for 
firms in Flanders and in Germany, using a conditional difference-in-differences estimator 
with repeated cross-sections. Employing parametric and semiparametric two-step selection 
models, Hussinger (2008) further finds evidence of additionality effects of publicly funded 
R&D on private R&D investment per employee in German manufacturing. Comparing the 
results of seven matching methods, a selection model and a difference-in-differences 
estimator for a dataset of Italian firms, Cerulli and Potì (2012) also reject full crowding-out of 
private R&D on average. Conducting a treatment effects analysis for manufacturing firms in 
Turkey as a developing country, Özçelik and Taymaz (2008) further corroborate the evidence 
of additionality effects. 
    Regarding recent panel data regression analyses, the result of additionality effects from the 
treatment effects analysis in Özçelik and Taymaz (2008) holds also for the various regression 
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analyses conducted in the study. Klette and Møen (2012) compare the results of two panel 
fixed effects studies on similar Norwegian firm data for the pre-2000 and post-2000 time 
periods 1982-1995 and 2001-2007. The authors conclude that the fact that their study on the 
earlier period does not find any significant degree of additionality, while the study by 
Henningsen, Haegeland and Møen (2012) on the later period does find additionality, suggests 
that the effectiveness of this policy tool has improved over time. Using a dynamic panel fixed 
effects instrumental variables estimator in an analysis of UK manufacturing industries for 
1993-2000, Becker and Pain (2008) find a positive effect of the share of business R&D 
funded by the government on the level of R&D. The study thus indicates that the decline in 
the share of manufacturing R&D financed by the government between 1992 and 1997 plays 
an important role in the explanation of the comparatively poor R&D performance of the UK 
seen over the 1990s. In a further dynamic panel data regression analysis, Bloch and 
Graversen (2012) obtain additionality effects of public R&D funding for a sample of Danish 
firms. For the business enterprise sector of 21 OECD countries, Falk (2006) does not find a 
significant effect in dynamic panel data models. Nonetheless, the general conclusion from the 
post-2000 empirical evidence must be that public R&D subsidies succeed in significantly 
stimulating private R&D investment. 
    There is growing evidence that public subsidies are particularly effective in increasing 
R&D of small firms, which are likely to be more financially constrained. Small firms have, 
for instance, less collateral in terms of existing assets to be used for obtaining loans, and as a 
group they are likely to include more young firms.6 Related to this, large firms' greater ability 
to secure funding for risky projects given capital market imperfections is one of the 
arguments put forward in support of the hypothesis that R&D increases more than 
proportionately with firm size, following Schumpeter (1939, 1942). One relevant study is 
Lach (2002) which uses a difference-in-difference estimator and finds for a sample of firms 
in Israel that subsidies for the small firms temporarily crowd out these firms' R&D, but have 
a strong stimulative effect after the first year of the subsidy. The author argues that this may 
reflect the fact that firms which receive the subsidy are committed to implement the 
subsidised project, but that this commitment may have led firms to temporarily scale down 
non-subsidised projects due to the serious skilled labour shortage that characterised the 
economic environment in Israel over the sample period 1990-1995. Subsidies for the large 
                                                          
6 For a survey of the empirical evidence on financial constraints for R&D by small versus large and young 
versus mature firms, see Hall (2002) and Hall and Lerner (2010). 
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firms in the sample are statistically insignificant. Most subsidies are granted to the large 
firms, however, which may explain the result that the average effect for the pooled sample, 
while positive, also is insignificant. These findings are interpreted as indicating that large 
firms get subsidies for projects that would also have been undertaken in the absence of the 
subsidy, whereas small firms use the subsidy to finance additional projects. From a policy 
point of view, the subsidy funds should therefore be redirected to the smaller firms. Using 
Finnish data, Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) further show that when there are economically 
significant capital market imperfections, small and medium-size firms in industries that are 
more dependent on external finance invest relatively more in R&D when more public funding 
is (potentially) available. Overall these results suggest that, on the one hand, subsidies 
targeted at financially constrained firms may raise overall private R&D spending, and that, on 
the other hand, policies designed to improve these firms' access to external finance might 
reduce the need for R&D subsidies.7 
    These conclusions are also compatible with evidence found by Almus and Czarnitzki 
(2003) for a transition economy, for which capital market imperfections may a priori also be 
expected to be relatively more pronounced. Applying a non-parametric matching approach to 
post-reunification cross-sections from the 1990s for East Germany, the study finds 
additionality effects of all public R&D subsidies on average. Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) 
moreover find that the additionality effect on firms' R&D and innovation input was more 
pronounced in Eastern Germany during the transition period than in Western Germany. One 
conclusion drawn by Czarnitzki (2006), however, is that while the subsidies were initially 
intended to accelerate the transformation process of East Germany from a planned to a 
market economy, the continuing high level of subsidisation may imply inefficiencies as 
market forces are weakened.8 
    González, Jaumandreu and Pazó (2005) model firms' decisions about performing R&D 
when some government support can be expected. Applying a semistructural framework to 
                                                          
7 There is some first evidence that award of a government subsidy may provide a positive signal about firm 
quality and thus help a firm attract additional private funding, hence easing the adverse effect of capital market 
imperfections. Meuleman and De Maeseneire (2012) provide compelling evidence that obtaining an R&D grant 
results in better access to long-term debt and to a lesser extent short-term debt for small and medium-size firms 
in Belgium. Feldman and Kelley (2006) find that R&D grants facilitate attracting venture capital for US firms 
that participate in the Advanced Technology Program. 
8 One novelty of this study is that it takes into account non-R&D performing firms and the endogeneity of their 
decision as to whether or not to invest in R&D. The study thereby explicitly considers the fact that a large share 
of small firms do not invest in R&D due to a lack of financial resources. 
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Spanish firm data, the authors find that public subsidies stimulate private R&D spending. 
However, there is only a very slight increase for those firms that would perform R&D 
anyway, whereas some small firms would not perform any R&D in the absence of (expected) 
public funding. Similarly to Lach (2002) the authors point out that subsidies are mainly 
awarded to firms that would have performed the R&D anyway, and that this suggests that 
public policy tends to neglect the inducing dimension of public funding. The importance of 
this dimension is also underlined by the results in Hall, Lotti and Mairesse (2009) who find 
for small and medium-size Italian firms that non-R&D performing firms are more likely to 
start investing in R&D if they receive a subsidy. In a cross-country analysis, Czarnitzki and 
Lopes Bento (2012) conclude that private R&D in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and 
Spain would benefit from an extension of public R&D subsidies to currently non-subsidised 
firms. Applying a matching approach to the same dataset as González, Jaumandreu and Pazó 
(2005), González and Pazó (2008) moreover find that, similarly as for small firms, R&D 
subsidies are more effective for firms operating in low-tech sectors, which the authors argue 
is probably also due to the inducement effect. In a study of UK manufacturing industries, 
Becker and Hall (2013) find that a higher share of government-funded R&D has a positive 
effect only for the low-tech industry group while being insignificant for the high-tech 
industry group. These results also suggest that high-tech firms substitute incremental public 
funding for internal funding. 
    Comparing the private R&D effects of EU versus national grants, using a sample of 
German firms, Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento (2011) conclude that the former yield higher 
effects than the latter, if funding is received from only one of the two sources. Two reasons 
are suggested: First, EU grants may on average distribute larger subsidies, or, second, their 
requirements might be such that only those firms that are most likely to top up the grant with 
private funding more substantially comply. The largest R&D effects are obtained through 
simultaneous funding from both sources, and Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento (2013) confirm that 
simultaneous receipt of multiple grants does not cause crowding-out. 
    There is both early and recent evidence of a different time pattern of the effects of tax 
credits and direct subsidies. Tax credits have a significant effect on R&D expenditure mainly 
in the short run, but only little in the long run, whereas subsidies have a positive effect in the 
medium to long run, but less so in the short run. Hence the effect of tax credits is quicker than 
that of direct subsidies (David, Hall and Toole, 2000; Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la 
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Potterie, 2003). The earlier study suggests that this time pattern at least in part likely reflects 
the fact that the tax offsets against earnings occur for R&D projects chosen by firms 
themselves, the incentives of which probably favour projects that will generate greater private 
profits in the short run. By contrast, subsidies apply to projects selected by the government, 
which may be of a long-term nature and create new opportunities that may induce firms to 
start further projects with internal funding at a later stage, as pointed out in the more recent 
study. The study further suggests that tax credits and direct subsidies are substitutes in that an 
increase in one dampens the effect of the other on business R&D. These results indicate that 
the design and implementation of the two policy tools may be more effective if performed in 
a coordinated way. 
    There is some first evidence that the effect of a public subsidy on private R&D may have 
an inverted U-shape. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003) obtain the strongest 
private R&D effects for medium average subsidisation rates of 4-11%, while rates above 20% 
are found to be associated with the substitution of government funds for private funds. Görg 
and Strobl (2007) similarly find an inverted U-curve effect for indigenous Irish 
manufacturing firms. These studies thus indicate that large grants may more likely act to 
finance private R&D activity that would have been undertaken anyway. From a policy point 
of view, the non-linear effect suggests that for any given public R&D budget, it may be more 
effective to grant some intermediate level of support to a larger number of firms than to 
provide a large amount of support to fewer firms. 
    With respect to the potential importance of international tax differences, Bloom and 
Griffith (2001) conclude in a cross-country analysis of eight OECD countries that R&D in 
one country responds to a change in the R&D tax credit in another country. This result 
suggests that at least part of the reason for the international mobility of R&D may be related 
to the increasing tax subsidies to R&D offered in many countries. One implication for R&D 
tax policy then is that the positive R&D effect of tax credits may be higher than previously 
estimated and increasing over time. Foreign tax competition may moreover become 
increasingly important as impediments to capital mobility come down. 
    Concluding, economists have generally been sceptical regarding the efficacy of tax credits, 
one reason being the view that R&D was not very sensitive to changes in its price. The recent 
evidence suggests much more unanimously than concluded in surveys of the earlier work that 
R&D tax credits have a positive effect on private R&D investment. Generally, the negative 
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demand elasticity of R&D with respect to its own tax price is estimated to be broadly around 
unity, at least in countries with a tax credit. The recent evidence predominantly also suggests 
that public R&D subsidies succeed in stimulating private R&D. The additionality effect has 
been shown to be particularly prevalent for small firms, which are more likely to experience 
external financial constraints. Moreover, these firms are more likely to start investing in R&D 
if they receive a subsidy. On the one hand, these results provide strong support of such 
government funding schemes. On the other hand, a number of studies report that most of the 
funding is awarded to larger firms that would have performed the R&D even in the absence 
of the public subsidy, which suggests that in these cases subsidies could be targeted more 
effectively. Indeed, Czarnitzki and Ebersberger (2010) report that governments in general 
prefer to grant R&D subsidies to larger firms and that this is a common general criticism of 
the distribution of subsidies: This kind of distribution may contribute to a higher 
concentration of R&D, the persistence of leadership in markets and higher barriers to entry, 
and thus eventually reduce competition. It may also be the case that a tax credit rather than a 
subsidy could be the more effective policy instrument for firms that are likely to simply 
substitute incremental public funding for internal funding, as the tax credit supports the 
private R&D that is actually expended by the firms. There is some evidence that both policy 
tools may be more effective if performed in a coordinated way and that tax credits are the 
more effective short-run policy option, while direct subsidies are the more effective medium 
to long-run policy. There is also some indication that the effect of a subsidy may have an 
inverted U-shape, so that subsidy levels that are too high crowd out private R&D, while 
intermediate levels stimulate private R&D. This could imply that it may be more effective to 
grant some intermediate level of support to a larger number of firms than to provide a larger 
amount of support to fewer firms. To date there are, however, only very few studies that 
investigate the relative effect of both tools or allow for a potential non-linear effect. Table 1 
summarises the key features of studies that represent the main results from the literature. 






3.2 Support of the university research system and the formation of high-skilled 
human capital 
    A growing body of evidence indicates that private R&D benefits from geographically 
localised knowledge spillovers from university research and from the availability of high-
skilled human capital resources. The notion that knowledge spillovers be localised goes back 
at least to Marshall's (1920) concept of the external economies. He illustrates this with the 
example of industry localisation and identifies three reasons for localisation, which can also 
be found in most of the more recent literature on regional economics and economic 
geography: A pooled market for workers with industry-specific skills, support of the 
production of non-tradable specialised inputs, and informational spillovers between firms that 
give clustered firms a better production function than isolated firms. The theoretical 
foundation of the geography of innovation is provided in Krugman (1991a, b) who shows 
how a country can endogenously develop into an industrialised `core' region and an 
agricultural `periphery' region. 
    An early case study which indicates that knowledge spillovers from university research 
may be a driving factor of firms' choice of location was provided by Dorfman (1983). Her 
results indicate that high-technology firms sought to locate close to universities, pointing to 
the importance of the MIT for the development of Boston's `high technology' Route 128 and 
of Stanford University for the location of `Silicon Valley'. Related to this, Nelson (1986) 
argues in the first formal indication of localised knowledge spillovers from universities to 
firms, that university research rarely in itself generates new technology, it rather enhances 
technological opportunities and the productivity of private R&D. In accordance with this, the 
much-cited study by Jaffe (1989) provides evidence of a large significant positive effect of 
university research on industry R&D spending within US states and concludes that a state 
that improves its university research system will increase local innovation by attracting 
industrial R&D. In support of Dorfman's (1983) early results, Woodward, Figueiredo and 
Guimaraes (2006) more recently find for the US that R&D expenditures at universities 
positively affect the location decision of new high-tech plants in a county. This positive effect 
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extends up to a maximum distance of approximately 145 miles between the university and the 
new plant.9 
    More recently there has been a growing number of studies using data for countries other 
than the US. Applying a modified version of Jaffe's (1989) R&D model to French data, 
Autant-Bernard (2001), for instance, finds positive externalities from public research to 
private R&D expenditures, and that these externalities are strongest within the same 
geographical area. Karlsson and Andersson (2009) provide evidence that industrial R&D in 
Sweden tends to increase in locations that offer high accessibility to university R&D. 
Abramovsky, Harrison and Simpson (2007) examine the relationship between the co-location 
of the average number of private sector R&D firms and university research departments in 
111 postcode areas in the UK. The authors match data for R&D labs in six product groups 
with data from the Research Assessment Exercise on the quality of university research. The 
strongest evidence for co-location is found for pharmaceutical business R&D and the most 
highly ranked chemistry university departments. Overall the results raise the possibility that 
private sector R&D may benefit from proximity to both, frontier basic university research and 
also more applied university research. The authors note that while the latter may be 
considered as low-quality research in terms of the Research Assessment Exercise and 
consequent university funding allocations, it may be relevant in some areas of technology 
transfer and in attracting foreign-owned R&D. In a related analysis, Abramovsky and 
Simpson (2011) confirm that pharmaceutical firms locate their R&D facilities close to 
frontier chemistry university departments. In addition, the results for the chemicals and 
vehicles industries potentially indicate the presence of knowledge flows between R&D 
activity and production activity. Conditional on location, the evidence for these latter two 
industries is again consistent with geographic proximity facilitating knowledge flows from 
universities. Rosa and Mohnen (2008) measure knowledge transfers from universities to 
firms by the amount of R&D payments made by firms to universities. The authors' empirical 
results for Canadian data corroborate the mounting evidence that a decrease in distance 
increases spillovers. 
    The existing literature on the US and a variety of other countries hence predominantly 
concludes that private R&D benefits from geographically localised knowledge spillovers 
                                                          
9 After controlling for other determinants of high-tech start-ups, university R&D is found to have only a small 
marginal effect on county location probabilities. This result might at least in part be due to the high-technology 
boom of the 1990s sample period, which exhibited its own specific start-up dynamics. 
19 
 
from university research. This has important implications for regional economic and 
development policies, and for the evaluation and funding of university research. One role this 
literature ascribes to regional R&D policy is to facilitate and support the formation of 
regional clusters of university and private R&D activity in order to exploit agglomeration 
economies. Supporting university research is likely to enhance regional technological 
opportunities and the productivity of private sector R&D. Improving the university research 
system and facilitating spillovers to the private sector has been shown to raise local private 
R&D spending. There is moreover some evidence that proximity to university research 
matters especially in high-tech sectors, which indicates that at least part of the spillovers are 
sector-specific and not just the diffuse effect of a large research university. Hence it could be 
effective for government support of university research to target in particular those sectors in 
which spillovers are found to be largest. The transmission channels of these knowledge 
spillovers as identified in the literature include direct personal interactions, university spin-off 
firms, consultancy, and university supply of a pool of highly-trained graduates for 
employment in industry.10 
    This last channel suggests that R&D conducive government support of the university 
system extends from the research side to the education side. Consistent with this, there is 
growing evidence that confirms important positive R&D effects of high-skilled human capital 
resources. These include highly qualified scientists and engineers (Adams, Chiang, Starkey, 
2001; Adams, Chiang, Jensen, 2003; Becker and Pain, 2008), and more generally the share of 
the number of workers with higher education in the total number of workers (García and 
Mohnen, 2010), the share of the population with tertiary education in the total working age 
population (Wang, 2010) and years of formal schooling (Kanwar and Evenson, 2003). This 
strand of the literature thus suggests a role for education policies and human capital 
investment in increasing private R&D. Table 2 summarises the key features of studies that 
represent the main results from the literature. 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
 
                                                          
10 Another channel is formal cooperation agreements, which are discussed in section 3.3. 
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3.3 Support of formal R&D cooperation 
    There is a growing literature that suggests positive private R&D effects of R&D 
cooperation between a variety of institutions. A firm's membership of a research joint venture 
has the obvious advantage that it may enable the firm to overcome a cost-of-development 
barrier that may otherwise prevent R&D investment, if R&D requires a minimum threshold 
investment to be effective at all. Another benefit is the reduction of wasteful duplication of 
R&D. These benefits are set against the potential adverse outcome that participants will tend 
to free-ride on each other's R&D investments in case of sufficient positive externalities from 
each firm's R&D efforts, or curtail competition in other stages of the firms' interaction, as 
emphasised in the theoretical contribution by Kamien, Mueller and Zang (1992).11 Imperfect 
ability to assimilate the returns from R&D and innovation increases the incentive to free-ride 
(Shapiro and Willig, 1990; Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1995). In their pioneering work on 
cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly, D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) show 
that in the presence of large spillovers, R&D cooperation leads to higher R&D spending by 
duopolists compared to the competitive case. A symmetric result is that for small spillovers, 
R&D cooperation reduces R&D spending by the firms. Regarding empirical testing and 
public policy, these results ascribe a central role to the degree of R&D externalities in the 
industry. When attempting to assess the welfare effects of R&D cooperation, one challenge 
for research is to take into account the factors that affect the level of spillovers through time. 
In an extension of the model by D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien, Mueller and 
Zang (1992) show that if firms create a research joint venture and also share information in 
that they cooperate on their R&D expenditure to maximise combined profits, i.e. they are 
cartelised in the R&D stage, consumer plus producer surplus are maximised. Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) point out that little is known today about the complementarities between a 
firm's own R&D programmes, cooperative agreements in R&D, and external technology 
acquisitions, and that a better understanding of these issues may enhance firms' ability to 
appropriate potential spillovers from R&D cooperation. R&D cooperation has played an 
increasing role in firms' innovative activities (Hagedoorn, 2002). Surveys of the industrial 
organisation and strategic management literatures on partner motives and outcomes of 
research joint ventures, or more generally on the theory of R&D cooperation, are provided by 
                                                          
11 Dixit (1988) provides an analysis within the framework of international competition. 
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Hagedoorn and Narula (1996), Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas (2000), Caloghirou, Ioannides 
and Vonortas (2003) and Sena (2004). 
    In an empirical analysis, Irwin and Klenow (1996) conclude that among firms who 
participated in Sematech, a joint R&D consortium of US semiconductor producers that was 
formed to develop new technologies for the production of computer chips, there was a drop in 
the total level of R&D expenditure. They interpret this as supporting the `sharing' hypothesis, 
with information flows reducing duplicative R&D, allowing members to spend less on R&D 
than before. This is contrasted with the `commitment' hypothesis of higher joint R&D 
expenditure on high-spillover types of R&D. Adams, Chiang and Jensen (2003) find that 
cooperation between federal laboratories and firms has a positive impact on private R&D 
expenditures and that no other channel of technology transfer from federal laboratories exerts 
a comparable effect. The authors point out that arrangements that strive to ensure effort by 
both, firms and federal laboratories, are required for technology transfer to be successful. 
    A first empirical insight into the potential effect of industry-university cooperative research 
centres on industry R&D expenditure is provided by Adams, Chiang and Starkey (2001) for 
the US. These centres are defined as "…small academic centers to foster technology transfer 
between universities and firms" (op. cit. p. 73). The results suggest that the development of 
these centres has fostered knowledge spillovers between universities and member firms. 
When the authors differentiate between National Science Foundation cooperative research 
centres and others, the effect is significant only for the former. However, the authors note that 
the coefficient may be biased upward as the centres are matched to larger and more 
productive laboratories. Two interpretions given by the authors are, first, that industry-
university cooperative research centres provide new projects and stimulate industrial 
research, and, second, that larger laboratories are attracted to them. Hall, Link and Scott 
(2003) examine the performance of 54 industry-university projects funded by the US 
Advanced Technology Program which combines public funds with private investments for 
the creation and application of generic technology needed to commercialise new technology 
rapidly. The study finds that projects with university involvement are more likely to be in 
new technological fields where R&D is closer to science and that, therefore, such projects 
experience more difficulty and delay, but are more likely not to be aborted prematurely. The 
authors' interpretation is that universities are contributing to basic research awareness and 
insight among partners in the funded projects. With respect to geographic proximity, Ponds, 
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Van Oort and Frenken (2007), using a sample of science-based industries in the Netherlands, 
find that proximity matters more when cooperating partners have different institutional 
backgrounds, such as universities and firms, than for organisations with similar institutional 
backgrounds. Geographic proximity may thus help overcome institutional differences 
between cooperators.12 
    Recent research indicates that spillover effects through R&D cooperation may also be 
mediated. Using a sample of Belgian manufacturing firms, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) 
provide evidence that firms are more likely to cooperate on R&D if they believe that external 
information flows, i.e. incoming knowledge spillovers, are probably important. Firms with 
more effective appropriation of the returns from their R&D, i.e. with lower outgoing 
spillovers, are also more likely to cooperate on R&D. However, the study's results suggest 
differences in the effects of incoming spillovers on the one hand and of appropriability on the 
other hand on the type of R&D cooperation sought. Incoming spillovers positively affect the 
probability that firms will cooperate with research institutes, such as universities and public 
or private research laboratories. This indicates that those firms which find the publicly 
available pool of knowledge more important as an input to their innovation process have a 
higher probability of benefiting from cooperative R&D agreements with research institutes. 
Appropriability has no significant impact on this type of cooperation, which is supported by 
Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) who argue that the more generic and uncertain nature of 
these R&D projects involves less intellectual property issues. Related to this, Hall, Link and 
Scott (2001) note that when research results are uncertain, neither party is able to define 
meaningful boundaries for any resulting intellectual property issues, and so it is then less 
likely that appropriability is an insurmountable issue. In contrast, appropriability positively 
affects the probability of firms' cooperation with customers and suppliers (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2002). The authors argue that this result suggests that only firms which can 
sufficiently protect their proprietary information are willing to engage in cooperative 
agreements with downstream and upstream firms, because the outcome of these more applied 
research projects, that is commercially sensitive information, often leaks out to competitors 
through common suppliers or customers. 
                                                          
12 This result is consistent with an earlier finding by Adams (2002), who reports for US data that university 
spillovers to private R&D are more localised than industrial spillovers to private R&D. 
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    There is a growing number of studies that apply the ideas in Cassiman and Veuglers (2002) 
to data for other countries. Schmidt (2005), for instance, finds that incoming spillovers and in 
particular appropriability matter for the decision by German manufacturing firms' to 
cooperate on R&D. For a sample of Spanish firms, Lopez (2008) in addition finds that 
strategic methods to protect the returns from R&D are particularly important for firms' R&D 
cooperation with direct competitor firms. This conclusion is in line with the respective results 
from the multicountry study for France, Germany, Spain and the UK by Abramovsky, 
Kremp, Lopez, Schmidt and Simpson (2009). While cooperation among competitor firms is 
not investigated in Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) due to a lack of data, the result is 
nonetheless consistent with this study's conclusion of the importance of protection from the 
leakage of commercially sensitive information to competitors. The findings in Belderbos, 
Carree, Diederen, Lokshin and Veugelers (2004) for the Netherlands further reflect greater 
appropriability concerns for cooperation between firms. Overall these studies thus suggest 
that the free-rider problem may be more serious within direct competitor agreements and 
hence that there is a role for government policy in providing appropriate intellectual property 
protection mechanisms. 
    The latter study moreover shows that firms tend to gravitate to the cooperation type that 
has the highest value in terms of source-specific incoming knowledge. Spillovers from 
universities and research institutes have a positive effect on all types of cooperation, i.e. 
cooperation with direct competitors, customers, suppliers, and research institutions. The 
authors argue that this result indicates that knowledge from universities and research 
institutes is more generic in nature and improves the technological opportunities and general 
effectiveness of a firm's own R&D and its R&D cooperation strategies. These observations 
hence are in accordance with those made by Cassiman and Veugelers (2005) and Hall, Link 
and Scott (2001) mentioned above, and those that suggest that university research enhances 
technological opportunities and the productivity of private R&D, as discussed in the previous 
section. 
    Consistent with the theoretical argument presented above, most empirical studies that 
examine the relevance of cost-sharing conclude that this is an important element in a firm's 
decision to cooperate on R&D (see e.g. Abramovsky, Kremp, Lopez, Schmidt, Simpson, 
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2009, and the references therein).13 There is also some evidence that suggests that public 
subsidies can stimulate R&D cooperation.14 First evidence on the relationship between 
subsidies for individual firm level research, research cooperation, and subsidies for 
cooperative research is provided by Czarnitzki, Ebersberger and Fier (2007). Using a sample 
of West German and Finnish firms, the study shows that firms that either receive individual 
public subsidies or cooperate on research would increase their R&D spending if they 
combined the two. This result supports the notion that public subsidies for R&D cooperation 
may be another means of raising private R&D. 
    Furman, Kyle, Cockburn and Henderson (2006) conclude that if competition between 
firms has a negative effect on R&D, there may be a trade-off between, on the one hand, a 
firm's incentive to locate close to for example universities in order to benefit from their 
locally generated public knowledge, and, on the other hand, the incentive to avoid 
geographically close competition with rival private firms which may choose the same near-
university location. One way around this trade-off may be the formation of cooperative R&D 
centres so as to turn competitors into cooperators. This again suggests a potential role for 
government policy in terms of providing appropriate incentive structures. 
    Taken together, the results from this strand of the literature suggest that governments may 
increase private R&D spending by facilitating and incentivising R&D cooperation. Policy 
measures include provision of direct funding for various forms of R&D cooperation and 
provision of appropriate intellectual property protection mechanisms. There exists some first 
evidence that geographic proximity may help to overcome institutional differences between 
cooperators, which suggests another rationale for facilitating and supporting regional clusters 
of R&D activity in order to exploit agglomeration economies. Table 3 summarises the key 
features of studies that represent the main results from this literature. 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
                                                          
13 Similarly to the positive signal of the award of a government subsidy (see footnote 7), recent research 
suggests that being a partner in horizontal R&D collaboration may also alleviate liquidity constraints by acting 
as a positive signal about firm quality and expected success of a project (see Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2012, 
and the references therein). 
14 There are, of course, a number of other determinants of R&D cooperation, an exploration of which is beyond 
the scope of this paper. The interested reader is referred to the surveyed studies. 
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4. QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
    The literature on the effects of public R&D policies on private R&D investment allows for 
a number of conclusions to be drawn about what policy measures likely incentivise further 
private R&D. Likewise, there are important issues that remain unresolved, and others that 
have not been considered in research to date. A few of these issues are discussed in the 
following. 
    Government R&D tax credits usually are assumed to be exogenous, but tax competition 
implies that they may be endogenous. In this respect, Hall and Van Reenen (2000) point out 
that understanding the process by which different tax credits are conceived, for instance why 
and when governments introduce tax breaks, is as important as evaluating their effect. More 
evidence on the relationship between the effect of a subsidy and the size of the subsidy, 
through estimating non-linear models, may also usefully inform policy in the light of the 
scarce evidence on the inverted U-curve effect of subsidies. Furthermore, there has been little 
research to date on the way that award of direct public R&D subsidies could be a signal about 
firm quality that helps a firm attract additional private funding and that hence potentially 
eases the effect of capital market imperfections. Further utilisation of international panel data 
seems another promising way forward: Identification of R&D tax credit or subsidy effects on 
private R&D is difficult for studies of single countries, as these policies are correlated with 
other policies aimed at increasing the appropriability of research benefits to firms that invest 
in areas of new technological opportunity. 
    The mounting empirical evidence which suggests that geographic proximity is important 
for knowledge spillovers from university research to private research says relatively little 
about the actual mechanisms of this knowledge transfer, albeit some have been identified 
more generally. It is therefore difficult to suggest specific policy recommendations, as for 
each transmission mechanism there is varying potential for market failures, as pointed out in 
Abramovsky, Harrison and Simpson (2007). The mechanisms of knowledge transfer may 
also differ across industries. Future research to identify the precise mechanisms at work could 
therefore be highly informative. Moreover, it would be useful to analyse further whether 
geographic proximity has any impact not just on the quantity but also on the quality of the 
transferred knowledge (Rosa and Mohnen, 2008). More explicit modelling of the endogeneity 
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of the location of research and any impact this may have on research findings would also be 
useful. 
    Developing in more detail the importance of distinguishing between incoming and 
outgoing spillover measures for a firm's R&D cooperation decisions also ought to be part of 
the future research agenda, as emphasised in Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). More evidence 
on the private R&D effects of public subsidies for different types of R&D cooperation could 
also usefully inform policy. Furthermore, the strength of intellectual property protection has 
been shown to have important effects on R&D cooperation between otherwise rival firms and 
between firms and their customers and suppliers, but has also received relatively little 
attention to date. 
    Evaluation studies of the effectiveness of existing policy measures also will be an 
important element of future work, in particular in the light of tight government resources in 
times of financial crisis and economic austerity. 
    Concluding, the overriding motivation for future research needs to be the search for 
appropriate policy design so as to increase private investment in R&D and generate positive 
returns for economic growth. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
    This paper has surveyed the literature on the effects of major public R&D policies on 
private R&D investment. These policies include R&D tax credits and subsidies, support of 
the university research system and the formation of high-skilled human capital, and support 
of formal R&D cooperation. The main conclusions from the literature on each of these three 
broad types of public policies are summarised in the following. 
    Economists have generally been sceptical regarding the efficacy of tax credits, one reason 
being the view that R&D was not very sensitive to changes in its price. The recent evidence 
suggests much more unanimously than concluded in surveys of the earlier work that R&D tax 
credits have a positive effect on private R&D investment. Generally, the negative demand 
elasticity of R&D with respect to its own tax price is estimated to be broadly around unity, at 
least in countries with a tax credit. The recent evidence predominantly also suggests that 
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public R&D subsidies succeed in stimulating private R&D, while the earlier literature much 
more often found crowding-out effects. The additionality effect has been shown to be 
particularly prevalent for small firms, which are more likely to experience external financial 
constraints. Moreover, these firms are more likely to start investing in R&D if they receive a 
subsidy. On the one hand, these results provide strong support of such government funding 
schemes. On the other hand, most of the funding is often awarded to larger firms that would 
have performed the R&D also in the absence of the public subsidy, which suggests that in 
these cases subsidies could be targeted more effectively. It may also be the case that a tax 
credit rather than a subsidy could be the more effective public policy instrument for firms that 
are likely to simply substitute incremental public funding for internal funding, as the tax 
credit supports the private R&D that is actually expended by the firms. There is some 
evidence that both policy tools may be more effective if performed in a coordinated way and 
that tax credits are the more effective short-run policy option, while direct subsidies are the 
more effective medium to long-run policy. There is also some indication that the effect of a 
subsidy may have an inverted U-shape, so that subsidy levels that are too high crowd out 
private R&D, while intermediate levels stimulate private R&D. This could imply that it may 
be more effective to grant some intermediate level of support to a larger number of firms than 
to provide a larger amount of support to fewer firms. To date there are, however, only very 
few studies that investigate the relative effect of both tools or allow for a potential non-linear 
effect. 
    The existing literature examining the effects of geographically localised knowledge 
spillovers from university research on private R&D predominantly concludes that these are 
positive. This has important implications for regional economic and development policies, 
and for the evaluation and funding of university research. One role this literature ascribes to 
regional R&D policy is to facilitate and support the formation of regional clusters of 
university and private R&D activity in order to exploit agglomeration economies. Supporting 
university research is likely to enhance regional technological opportunities and the 
productivity of private sector R&D. Improving the university research system and facilitating 
spillovers to the private sector has been shown to raise local private R&D spending. There is 
moreover some evidence that proximity to university research matters especially in high-tech 
sectors, which indicates that at least part of the spillovers are sector-specific and not just the 
diffuse effect of a large research university. Hence it could be effective for government 
support of university research to target particularly those sectors in which spillovers are 
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found to be largest. The transmission channels of knowledge spillovers from university 
research to private research as identified in the literature to date include direct personal 
interactions, university spin-off firms, consultancy, and university supply of a pool of highly-
trained graduates for employment in industry. This last channel suggests that R&D conducive 
government support of the university system extends from the research side to the education 
side. Consistent with this, there is growing evidence that confirms important positive R&D 
effects of high-skilled human capital resources. These include highly qualified scientists and 
engineers and more generally the share of the number of workers with higher education in the 
total number of workers, the share of the population with tertiary education in the total 
working age population, and years of formal schooling. This literature thus suggests a role for 
education policies and human capital investment in increasing private R&D. 
    Another channel for knowledge spillovers between research institutes and private research, 
and between firms, are formal R&D cooperation agreements. Taken together, the results from 
this growing literature suggest that governments may increase private R&D spending by 
facilitating and incentivising R&D cooperation. External information flows, i.e. incoming 
knowledge spillovers, and more effective appropriability of the returns to R&D, i.e. lower 
outgoing spillovers, have been shown to increase the likelihood of R&D cooperation in 
general. In particular, incoming spillovers positively affect the probability that firms will 
cooperate with research institutes, such as universities and public or private research 
laboratories. Appropriability is less important for these types of cooperations due to the more 
generic and uncertain nature of such R&D projects, involving less intellectual property 
issues. In contrast, appropriability positively affects the probability of firms' cooperation with 
customers and suppliers and with direct competitors, where potential leakage of 
commercially sensitive information may prevent cooperation. Policy measures in support of 
R&D cooperation thus include provision of appropriate intellectual property protection 
mechanisms and direct cooperation subsidies. There exists some first evidence that 
geographic proximity may help to overcome institutional differences between cooperators, 
which suggests another rationale for facilitating and supporting regional clusters of R&D 
activity in order to exploit agglomeration economies. 
    Recent evidence moreover suggests that award of an R&D subsidy or partnership in 
horizontal R&D cooperation may act as positive signals about the quality of a firm and the 
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expected success of a project and thus enable a firm to attract additional private funding, 
hence easing the adverse effect of capital market imperfections. 
    The advances as well as the gaps in the literature to date point to avenues of research the 
pursuit of which seems interesting and valuable to better understand the available range of 
public R&D policies and their effects on the incentives that drive private R&D investment. 
While much work remains to be done, recent progress has been rapid and very productive. 
The improved insights look certain to improve further in future work, and the subject is set to 
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Table 1. Studies on R&D tax credits and direct subsidies 
Study /  
Estimation Methodology 
Tax Credit or 
Subsidy 
Country/ies Level of 
Aggregation 
       R&D Policy Variables                 Effect      Control Variables          Effect Period 
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expenditure / output 
- The results are reported from 
the authors’ preferred dynamic 
specification which imposes 
constant returns. 
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the final specification. 
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for (and finds) a non-linear 


















B-index of fiscal generosity to-
 wards R&Dt-1 = (after-tax cost 
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interaction term of subsidyt-1 
 and share of subsidy in total 
 business-performed R&Dt-1 
interaction term of subsidyt-1 
 and squared share of subsidy 












gov’t intramural R&Dt-1  








Note: The dependent variable is R&D expenditure unless mentioned otherwise. Dv and ldv denote dependent variable and lagged dependent variable, respectively. S (ns) 
denotes significance (insignificance) of the coefficient at the 5% or higher level. S/r (l/r) denote short-run (long-run) coefficient. (-) denotes negative coefficient. ∆t is first 
difference. The abbreviations GLS, GMM, IV, OLS, and 3SLS follow the conventional ways to denote generalised least squares, generalised method of moments, instrumental 
variables, ordinary least squares, and three stage least squares. Gov’t denotes government, log denotes logarithm or natural logarithm. Dummy variables distinguishing 
between a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to a question were set equal to 1 (0) when the answer was ‘yes’ (‘no’), unless mentioned otherwise. 
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Table 2. Studies on spillovers from university research and high-skilled human capital 
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Note: See Table 1 for the abbreviations and further notes. 
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Table 3. Studies on formal R&D cooperation 
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 processes, from 1 (unimportant) to 5  
 (crucial): patents; registration of  
 brands, copyright (rescaled between  
 0 and 5)) 
size (= firm sales in 1992 in 1010  
 Belgian francs) 
size squared 
 
cost (= sum of scores of importance of 
 following obstacles to innovation  
 process, from 1 (unimportant) to 5  











  s) 
ns(-, 10 








 available; high costs of innovation;  
 payback period too long; innovation  
 cost hard to control (rescaled  
 between 0 and 1)) 
risk (= importance of high risks as an  
 obstacle to innovation, from 1  
 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial), rescaled  
 between 0 and 1)) 
complementarities (= 1 – importance  
 of lack of technological information  
 as an obstacle to innovation, from 1  
 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial), rescaled  
 between 0 and 1)) 
industry level (mean) of cooperation  
 where industry level is defined at 2- 















Note: See Table 1 for the abbreviations and further notes. 
Table 1. Studies on R&D tax credits and direct subsidies 
Study /  
Estimation Methodology 
Tax Credit or 
Subsidy 
Country/ies Level of 
Aggregation 
       R&D Policy Variables                 Effect      Control Variables          Effect Period 




- Dv: (industry-funded) R&D 
expenditure / output 
- The results are reported from 
the authors’ preferred dynamic 
specification which imposes 
constant returns. 




user cost of R&D 
 











- The results are reported from 
the final specification. 







all  small   large 
firms firms  firms 
s(-)  s(-)   ns(-) 





all    s     l 
s      ns  ns 
1991-
95 
GUELLEC, VAN POTTESLBERGHE 
DE LA POTTERIE (2003) 
IV (3SLS, log-log, first-
differences) 
 
- The results are reported from 
the regression that tests directly 
for (and finds) a non-linear 


















B-index of fiscal generosity to-
 wards R&Dt-1 = (after-tax cost 
 of a 1$ R&D investment) / (1– 
 corporate income tax rate) 
interaction term of subsidyt-1 
 and share of subsidy in total 
 business-performed R&Dt-1 
interaction term of subsidyt-1 
 and squared share of subsidy 












gov’t intramural R&Dt-1  








Note: The dependent variable is R&D expenditure unless mentioned otherwise. Dv and ldv denote dependent variable and lagged dependent variable, respectively. S (ns) 
denotes significance (insignificance) of the coefficient at the 5% or higher level. S/r (l/r) denote short-run (long-run) coefficient. (-) denotes negative coefficient. ∆t is first 
difference. The abbreviations GLS, GMM, IV, OLS, and 3SLS follow the conventional ways to denote generalised least squares, generalised method of moments, instrumental 
variables, ordinary least squares, and three stage least squares. Gov’t denotes government, log denotes logarithm or natural logarithm. Dummy variables distinguishing 
between a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to a question were set equal to 1 (0) when the answer was ‘yes’ (‘no’), unless mentioned otherwise. 
Table 2. Studies on spillovers from university research and high-skilled human capital 






University Research and Human Capital    Effect  
                     Variables             
               Control Variables                  Effect Period 
JAFFE (1989) 
IV (3 SLS, log-log) 
 
- The results are reported 
from the all-areas industry 
R&D equation. 




university research: spending by 
 departments (technical areas: drugs, 
 chemicals, electronics, mechanical arts, 














Negative binomial regression  
 
- Dv: average number of 
firms carrying out intramural 
R&D  
- The results are reported 
from the all-firms regression 






presence of university, dummy: yes or no 
number of universities 
average university quality 
number of univ. departments rated 1-4 
 [maximum quality: 5*]: 
  biology 
  chemistry 
  medical 
number of univ. dept’s rated 5 and 5*: 
  biology 
  chemistry 
  medical 
no. of research students in 1-4 dept’s 















total manufacturing employment (log) 
diversification index (= (1-H) x 100, 
 where H= sum of squared share of 
 employment in 4-digit industry i in 
 total manufacturing employment in 
 the postcode area) [index increasing 
 in extent of diversification] 
% of total manufacturing employment 
 that is in pharmaceuticals industry 
% of economically active population 
 that is qualified to degree equivalent 














KANWAR, EVENSON (2003) 
Random effects GLS (log-
log) 
 
- Dv: R&D / gross national 
product 
- The results are reported 
from the preferred model of 
the paper’s exercise 1 that 
includes the countries with 
available data for all 
variables considered in the 
general-to-specific modelling 
methodology. 
 29 countries 
(panel data) 
average number of years of formal  
 schooling of the population aged 15 
 years or above t 
s gross domestic savings / GDP (as a  
 proxy for internal funds available for  
 R&D) t-1 
index of intellectual property (patent)  
 protection t (values from 0-5 from  
 lowest to highest protection; index 
 incorporates five aspects of patent  
 laws: extent of coverage,  
 membership of international patent  
 agreements, duration of protection,  
 provisions for loss of protection,  









Note: See Table 1 for the abbreviations and further notes. 
Table 3. Studies on formal R&D cooperation 






    Cooperation, Spillovers and Human       Effect 
                Capital Variables 
               Control Variables                  Effect Period 











member of Industry-University  
 Cooperative Research Center, dummy: 
 yes or no 
 
number of PhD or MD scientists in the  






recent firm sales (log) 
stock of firm’s patents near the  
 laboratory over the past 20 years t-1  
share of lab science and engineering  
 fields in science rather than  
 engineering 
















- Dv: company-financed 
laboratory R&D net of 





member of Cooperative R&D 
 Agreement between firms and 
 federal labs, dummy: yes or no 
 
number of PhD scientists in the 







stock of sales over the last 12 years 
 (log) 
R&D in rest of firm (log) 
dummies for lab characteristics 
gov't contractor dummy: yes or no 
value of procurement near the lab (log) 



















- Dv: cooperation dummy: 
yes or no (cooperation with 
suppliers or customers or 
competitors or public 
research institutes or private 
research institutes or 
universities) 
- The results are reported 
from the specification that 
controls for endogeneity and 
excludes the insignificant 




incoming spillovers (= sum of scores of  
 importance of following information  
 sources for innovation process, from 1  
 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial): patent  
 information; specialised conferences,  
 meetings, publications; trade shows and  
 seminars (rescaled between 0 and 1)) 
 
 
appropriability (= sum of scores of  
 effectiveness of following methods for  
 protecting new products / processes,  
 from 1 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial):  
 secrecy; complexity of product or  
 process design; lead time on competitors;  











  s) 
industry level (mean) of legal  
 protection, where industry level is  
 defined at 2-digit NACE (= sum of  
 scores of effectiveness of following  
 methods or protecting new products /  
 processes, from 1 (unimportant) to 5  
 (crucial): patents; registration of  
 brands, copyright (rescaled between  
 0 and 5)) 
size (= firm sales in 1992 in 1010  
 Belgian francs) 
size squared 
 
cost (= sum of scores of importance of 
 following obstacles to innovation  
 process, from 1 (unimportant) to 5  











  s) 
ns(-, 10 






 available; high costs of innovation;  
 payback period too long; innovation  
 cost hard to control (rescaled  
 between 0 and 1)) 
risk (= importance of high risks as an  
 obstacle to innovation, from 1  
 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial), rescaled  
 between 0 and 1)) 
complementarities (= 1 – importance  
 of lack of technological information  
 as an obstacle to innovation, from 1  
 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial), rescaled  
 between 0 and 1)) 
industry level (mean) of cooperation  
 where industry level is defined at 2- 















Note: See Table 1 for the abbreviations and further notes. 
